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August, 2002The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), established in 1993, is a civil society initiative to promote 
an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in the decision-making and implementing 
process. The dialogues are designed to address important policy issues and to seek constructive 
solutions to these problems. The Centre has already organised a series of such dialogues at local, 
regional and national levels. The CPD has also organised a number of South Asian bilateral and 
regional dialogues as well as some international dialogues. These dialogues have brought together 
ministers, opposition front benchers, MPs, business leaders, NGOs, donors, professionals and other 
functional groups in civil society within a non-confrontational environment to promote focused 
discussions. The CPD seeks to create a national policy consciousness where members of civil 
society will be made aware of critical policy issues affecting their lives and will come together in 
support of particular policy agendas which they feel are conducive to the well being of the country.  
 
In support of the dialogue process the Centre is engaged in research programmes which are both 
serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for particular dialogues organised by the Centre 
throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes of CPD include The Independent 
Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Governance and Development, Population and 
Sustainable Development, Trade Policy Analysis and Multilateral Trading System and 
Leadership Programme for the Youth. The CPD also carries out periodic public perception surveys 
on policy issues and developmental concerns. 
 
Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical developmental issues continues to remain 
an important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this CPD maintains an active publication 
programme, both in Bangla and in English. As part of its dissemination programme, CPD has 
decided to bring out CPD Occasional Paper Series on a regular basis. Dialogue background papers, 
investigative reports and results of perception surveys which relate to issues of high public interest 
will be published under its cover. The Occasional Paper Series will also include draft research 
papers and reports, which may be subsequently published by the CPD. 
 
The present paper, Privatisation in Bangladesh: An Agenda in Search of a Policy has been 
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Privatisation in Bangladesh: 
  An Agenda in Search of a Policy 
 
INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE PAPER 
 
Bangladesh has been exposed to a process of privatisation of its economic space for the best part of 
two decades. This process has moved from the transfer of ownership and management in contested 
space, in the area of manufacturing output and in the financial sector into domains which have 
traditionally remained the preserve of the state sector, such as education, healthcare, and public 
infrastructure. The underlying socio-political dynamics of this process is a subject of some 
fascination both to students of political economy as well as development administration. This is an 
area which has been addressed by me in other publications and constitutes part of my ongoing work 
so any discussion of this subject remains premature. In this paper it is therefore intended to focus on 
an overview of the actual privatisation experience in Bangladesh over the last 20 years. This will 
look at the expanding compass of privatisation, its underlying problems and will review the limited 
evidence which is at hand in analysing its outcome. The concluding part will discuss some possible 
implications of the present approach to privatisation in Bangladesh on the development process in 
Bangladesh. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL INHERITANCE OF BANGLADESH 
 
The role of the state 
 
 
Historically, Bangladesh's development, in what passes for the modern sector of the economy, has 
been greatly influenced by public action. To the extent that agriculture was and remains the lead 
sector of the economy this has always delimited the contribution of the state sector to the economy, 
since the rural economy has remained under private ownership, as does small and rural industry, 
petty trade and transport. Thus, the contribution of the state owned enterprises (SOE) to value added 
at the apogee of the extension of public sector, in 1974, stood at 16.3% (Sobhan and Ahmed). If we 
look at yet another measure of the role of the state in the economy, the share of public expenditure to 
GDP then Bangladesh's share in 1972 stood at 9.2% which by 1995/96 had risen to 18.3%; this 
figure however, remains low by the standards of many developing and developed countries. 
 
Allowing for the structural parameters which limit the compass of the SOE sector in the Bangladesh 
economy, the state has traditionally played a pioneering role in promoting development even in the  
rural  economy. Thus the green revolution, based on the use of HYV technology, using fertiliser and 
irrigation was initiated in the 1960s under state sponsorship where various public corporations 
played an important role in dissemination of this technology, as well as in the installation of 
irrigation systems and distribution of fertiliser, both heavily subsidised from the state budget. State 
funds were also used in the provision of micro-credit under various state supported initiatives, 
promoting integrated rural development, which also involved heavy public investments in rural 
infrastructure development. The state sector from the outset has also played a pioneering role in the 
development of power, gas, urban water supply and drainage, the development of the entire 
communications infrastructure on land, in the air and the rivers as well as telecommunications. State 
funds have also largely underwritten developments in public educations at all levels, healthcare and 
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family planning, investment in science and technology. All these areas mentioned above, had from 
the inception of public action in the 1960's, been uncontested in their monopoly of economic space 
in Bangladesh. It was till very recently, taken for granted by professionals, public and donors that 
any development in these areas must originate from public action and expenditure. 
 
In the area of contested space for manufacture and finance, the Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation (PIDC), as well as various development finance institutions (DFI) played a pioneering 
role in the development of the jute and textile sector through joint ventures, first with non-Bengali 
entrepreneurs in the 1950s and later in the 1960s, to promote Bengali entrepreneurs through equity 
support and loan finance (Hexner). This lead role by the state in promoting development in virtually 
all the key sectors of the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh economy, derived from the prevailing 
development paradigm of that era which vested a lead role with the state in all areas where private 
entrepreneurs were seen as incapable or unwilling to play a risk taking role as equity investors. 
Outside of manufacturing and finance, the salience of the state as the catalyst of development was 
heavily underwritten by all aid donors of diverse political persuasions. 
 
 
Even in the area of industrial development and finance there was a ready acceptance that the state 
had a role to play in the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, economy. Investment in a variety of 
medium and heavy industry protects set up by the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation 
(EPIDC) were financed by various aid donors ranging from the World Bank, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan, France, UK, Canada, Switzerland, USSR and Poland. 
 
 
The multilateral agencies, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), played a key role 
in channelling funds through the DFI to promote private enterpreneurship in Bangladesh. This was 
supportive of the strategy of the Pakistan government, duing the 1960s to invest public resources in 
encouraging the emergence of a state sponsored Bengali bourgeoise with a stake in the economy. In 
the second half of the 1960's, in private sector, Bengali participation in the jute industry, the lead 
industry inherited by Bangladesh, was catalysed by the EPIDC, which invested its equity in joint 
ventures with a number of  first generation Bengali entrepreneurs. The DFIs also invested term loans 
to assist this process. As a result, a five million dollar jute mill could be vested in a prospective 




The entrepreneurial inheritance 
 
The lead role of the state derived from the historic dominance of economic space in Bangladesh by a 
non-Bengali entrepreneurial class, dating from the days of British rule, extending into the period of  
Pakistan rule between 1947-71 (Papanek). At the time of the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistani 
rule in December 1971 the ownership structure in the modern manufacturing sector in Bangladesh 
was as follows: 
                                                                       
 




  DISPERSAL OF OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY IN BAGNALDESH IN 1969/70 
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  Number of units  Value of fixed 
assets in Tk. mil 
% share of fixed 
assets 
A. EPIDC  53  2097  34 
B. Private sector 
 
   i.  Non-Bengali/Pakistani 
 
   ii. Foreign 
 























Source: Sourced from Table 10.1 (Sobhan and Ahmed) 
 
In such areas as banking, insurance, ocean shipping, inland water transport, foreign aid interwing 
trade, domestic wholesale trade and even large retail establishments, private business activity was 
largely dominated by non-Bengalis. On the eve of the surrender by the Pakistani army, as of 16 
December, 1971, to the joint forces of the India and Bangladesh, there was a wholesale withdrawal 
of this non-Bengali business class from Bangladesh. This class feared for their security in the post-
liberation Bangladesh, in the charged milieu created as a consequence of the bloody war of genocide 
waged by the Pakistan army against the Bengalis during 1971. This precipitous withdrawal of the 
Pakistanis left a major entrepreneurial vacuum at the heart of the Bangladesh economy, since these 
non-Bengalis, were largely drawn from a few ethnic communities specialising in commerce 
(Papanek). Their business houses traditionally operated through close-knit family dominated 
management structures which had not only made the key entrepreneurial decisions but had also 
deployed their clans people in these family dominated enterprises in areas of senior, middle and even 
shop floor management. Thus at the liberation of Bangladesh, large areas of the economy lay 
abandoned, not just physically both managerially, with enterprise capacity left idle, little new 
investment, run down inventories and accumulated bank overdrafts bequeathed to Bangladesh by 
their departed Pakistani owners. In the same way, banks, insurance companies, most of the 
mercantile economy lay abandoned. This served to dry up the very lubricants which service the 
dynamics of an economy. 
 
At liberation there was no readymade Bengali entrepreneurial class at hand to fill the economic 
space vacated by the departing Pakistanis. Bengali entrepreneurs accounted for 18% of 
manufacturing assets, mostly located in the jute and textile industry, where, we have observed, a first 
generation class of entrepreneurs had been inducted, under state patronage, over less than a decade, 
into arrange of medium scale manufacturing activities. A small class of Bengalis had moved into 
banking sector Bengali owned banks accounted for 18% of deposits whilst Pakistani owned banks 
accounted for 70% of the deposits (Sobhan and Ahmad). 12 Bengali insurance companies accounted 
for only a small share of the insurance business which was also dominated by the Pakistani 
companies. 
 
The background to the extension of the state sector 
 
Given the limited private entrepreneurial capacity to fill the vacuum bequeathed by the abrupt 
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withdrawal of the Pakistani entrepreneurs, the Government of Bangladesh had to assume control 
over all the abandoned enterprises. This involved a disproportionate expansion of the public space 
into the traditional domain of private entrepreneurship. The post-liberation government of 
Bangladesh (GOB) found itself in control of 47% of modern manufacturing capacity over and above 
the 34% under ownership of EPIDC, a large part of the financial sector along with a large number of 
small commercial establishments.  
 
Ideology had very little to do with the growth in the size of the state sector in the economy during 
1972. Where ideology did come into play, was in the take over of Bengali owned enterprises in jute 
and textile as well as in banking and insurance as a result of a policy decision to nationalise these 
sectors, taken in March 1972 and formalised under Presidential Order (PO) no. 27. It is however 
evident that the major contribution to the growth of the SOE sector originated in historical 
circumstances created by the liberation of Bangladesh. 
 
This review of the background to the growth of the state sector in post-liberation Bangladesh is 
important if we are to contexualise the subsequent privatisation process. We have observed that the 
origins of this expansion lay in the pre-liberation inheritance of an extended public sector, the 
domination of private space by an expatriate business class whose precipitate withdrawal left a 
gaping entrepreneurial vacuum to be filled by the state and an underdeveloped Bengali commercial 
bourgeoisie whose exposure to industrial management was at its first generation stage, barely a 
decade old.  
 
It was apparent to the post-liberation GOB that, whatever ideological influence informed their 
approach to the role of the state, there was no way that they could continue to retain responsibility 
over the 725 enterprises inherited by them from the departed Pakistanis. The original P.O. defing the 
scope of state investment in the manufacturing sector thus limited the take over of abandoned 
enterprises to those with fixed assets above Tk. 1.5 million. This involved 263 enterprises with total 
assets valued at Tk. 2630 million. This left 462 enterprises with an estimated asset value of Tk. 256 
million to be divested to private ownership. Over and above these manufacturing establishments a 
large number of Pakistani owned commercial establishments under the administration of the GOB, 
which at no stage were intended to be kept under state ownership, also had to be divested. The 
popular rhetoric that the post- liberation government quite indiscriminately `nationalised' even Paan 
shops thus bore no relationship to the policy or indeed the intent of the GOB at that time.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of liberation, with a large part of the infrasture damaged by war, closed 
factories and employees facing starvation, the primary goal of the government was survival of the 
population and meeting the human needs of both workers and consumers. At that stage there was no 
guiding strategy to set either ownership parameters or management guidelines. The decision to 
nationalise the larger of the abandoned units established a policy framework under P.O. 27 for 
determining the future of the abandoned enterprises. P.O. 27 not only expanded the frontiers of the 
SOE sector but left the government with a major task of divesting itself of those units which had 
enjoyed only a brief tenure under public administration and whose ownership now remained in a 
juridical limbo. 
 
However, to deciding to dispose of a large number of enterprises under the administration of the 
government, saddled with large debts, no inventory, little managerial back- up, is rather more 
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difficult than appears to be contemplated by the Privatisation Division of the World Bank. In the 
post-liberation period these units had been put under the temporary management of a miscellany of 
people enjoying the patronage of the then government. Many such units were put under officially 
designated administrators. Some of these administrators were government servants, some were 
private citizens close to the then government. Some were put under the management of junior 
managers already employed by the erstwhile owners of the abandoned enterprises, some were even 
put in control of the workers of these enterprises.  
 
The weakness in the performance of these ad hoc appointee managers was, as may be expected, 
mixed. Some performed quite well, given the extraordinary difficulties each enterprise faced at that 
time. Some performed badly either due to inexperience or malfeasance or both. The predatory 
tendencies of some of these managers was one of the compelling reasons of the then GOB to finally 
nationalise the most viable of these abandoned enterprises which could not be left to the mercies of 
such predators. The nationalised units were all units with fixed assets valued at more than Tk. 1.5 
million. Many of these, such as the large jute and textile mills or the Karnaphuli Paper Mills owned 
by the Dawood group, made a major contribution to Bangladesh's economy. It was thus imperative 
for the government to put such high production potential within the institutional discipline of a 
public body who would be made accountable for the performance of the enterprises. 11 sector 
corporation were set up and the 263 now nationalised abandoned enterprises were distributed 
amongst these corporations along with 53 enterprises owned by EPIDC as well as 75 Bengali owned 
enterprises in the Jute and Textile sector and one Bengali owned sugar mill.  
 
It is argued that this single act of establishing accountability through placing the abandoned units 
under the ownership of the sector corporations saved many of these once viable enterprises owned 
by the Pakistanis, from commercial disintegration. Many of these units, once put within the control 
of public corporations were indeed revitalised with new investments since their Pakistani owners 
had starved them of fresh resources, preferring to divert their profit to West Pakistan. However, not 
all the units put under the corporations were run as efficiently as they used to be under their former 
owners. The new managers suffered from both lack of experience and in some cases the owner's 
incentive to perform. But this was far from being a universal pattern and many enterprises indeed 
improved their performance under public management, compared to their performance under 
Pakistani ownership putting in additional investments, upgraded technology and even more 
professional management. Many of the corporation executives and SOE managers, during those 
early years, worked long hours without adequate material incentive, with great dedication as well as 
imagination, under extraordinarily adverse circumstances. The facts and dynamics of public 
enterprise performance in that period have been discussed elsewhere (Sobhan and Ahmed) and need 
not detour us in this paper. 
 
BANGLADESH'S APPROACH TO PRIVATISATION 
 
The changing perspective on SOE 
 
The rather mixed performance record of the SOE performance in the post-liberation period has, 
following the assassination of Bangabandhu President Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 and the 
change of regime through a military coup, been superceded in public discourse by a popularised 
belief that all enterprises under the Corporations performed badly due to their being under public 
ownership. This popular perception, which made its appearance from the mid 1970s, has crept into 
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the policy orientations of successive policy makers who began to themselves argue that all SOEs 
performed abysmally, without making any differentiation between various corporation and within 
these, between various enterprises as to their actual economic performance, market regime and 
operating environment. This universalist perspective was reinforced by the change in the 
developmental vision emanating from the multilateral lending agencies, who began to argue, with 
increasing stridency that the government should withdraw from `business' through disinvestments of 
all SOEs. This view was apotheosised in the work of the World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business, 
published in 1995. 
 
The evolution of privatisation policy 
 
The evolution of Bangladesh's privatisation policy reflects both the outcome of regime changes in 
1975 as well as the evolution in the thinking of the donor agencies on this subject. Under Pakistani 
rule, through the 1950s and 1960s state policy on the SOEs had remained pragmatic. In the Pakistan 
period the approach was to set up industries in the state sector where private enterprise was not 
forthcoming and to privatise state enterprises to private agents who were willing to invest in such 
units. The pioneering effort by PIDC to found a jute industry in Pakistan led to the disinvestments of 
PIDC's stake to the leading Pakistani business houses of the period (Hexner). In later years, 
Karnaphuli Paper Mill, a large public enterprises was sold at a sub-market price to the Dawoods, 
Pakistan's leading business family. In the late 60's some units in the textile and sugar sector were 
divested to Bengali entrepreneurs. In the immediate post-liberation period policy for a brief period 
committed itself to establishing the paramountcy of the state sector over the economy. However 
even during this period, we have observed that the paramount of the state in business activity was 
largely inspired by historical circumstance rather than ideology. 
 
The process of divestment of all these units not corporated in Presidential Order 27 thus began from 
1973. Between 1972-75, Table 2 shows that 114 units, with a sale value of Tk. 41 million were 
divested. These were small units with an average unit value of Tk. 360,000. This process of 
divestment was stepped up in the second half of the 1970's with a decision to divest jute spinning 
mills and some specialised textile units on the grounds that they were not covered by the 
nationalisation order of March 1972 which extended to only jute and textile mills. The approach of 
the GOB in the second half of the 1970's during the tenure of the late President Ziaur Rahman, was 
to directly promote private entrepreneurship through an ambitious programme of term loans 
extended through the DFIs which had in turn been underwritten by loans from the World Bank, 
ADB and other donors. This approach assumed the co-existence of an extended SOE sector with a 










                                                                      TABLE 2 
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  PHASING OF THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS 
 
   1    2   3    4    5    6    7 









Unit value (Tk.) 
(3÷2) 





1. Pre  liberation    13    23,87,125   23,87,125    183625.00    100%  .10 
2.  1st Jan. 1972-30 June 
1975 
  114     4,10,63,276     4,05,22,381    360204.18    99%  1.68 
3.  1st July 1975-30 June 
1981 
  247*      52,93,77,694      48,89,17,651    2143229.53    92%  21.72 
4.  1st July 1981-30 June 
1991 
  125**     126,33,19,190       99,64,12,927    10106553.52    79%  51.83 
5.  1st July 1991 -    6    60,14,61,528    58,08,87,814    100243588.00    96.5%  24.67 
  Total    505     243,76,08,813     210,91,27,898    4826948.15    86.5%  100 
 
*  16 industries were given back to the original Bangladeshi owners free of cost. 
*    5 industries were taken back by the govt. for nonpayment of the dues by the buyers. 
**  6 industries were taken back by the govt. for nonpayment of the dues by the buyers. 
 
Source: Board of Investment 
 
  TABLE 3 
 
  SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATISED UNITS 
 
   1    2   3    4    5    6    7   8 










Balance (Tk.)  Dispersal 
by sale 
value 
5 as % 
of 3 
1.  Below Tk. 25 
lakh 
 384  16,23,58,655  4,22,809  15,44,30,076  79,28,579   7%    95% 
2.  Tk. 25 lakh - 
Tk. 1 crore 
 77  39,45,57,004  51,24,117  35,98,85,169  3,46,71,835    16%    91% 
3.  Tk. 1 crore - 5 
crore 
 32  71,51,86,779  2,23,49,586  58,24,34,598  13,27,57,181    29%    81% 
4.  Tk. 5 crore - 10 
crore 
 9  54,90,40,028  6,10,04,448  46,49,65,379  8,40,74,648    23%    85% 
5.  Tk. 10 crore +    3  61,21,77,350  20,40,59,117  54,31,23,651  6,90,53,699    25%    89% 
   Total    505  243,76,08,813    210,91,27,898  32,84,80,915    100%    86.5% 
 
Source: Board of Investment 
 
There was some discussion in the later years of the Zia regime, over returning those jute and textile 
mills once owned by Bangladeshis, which had been nationalised under P.O. 27. At one stage around 
1979/80 it was reported that the jute mills nationalised from the Bengalis in March 1972 would be 
returned to their owners. However this position was reversed when the units under the Bangladesh 
Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC) turned in a net profit of Tk. 1062 million in 1979/80 and Tk. 338 
million in 1980/81. It was argued that there was no grounds for divestment since the BJMC had 
established the potential for earning profits from its SOEs in the jute sector. 
 
 
By inference, the implicit premise of the Zia regime's, privatisation policy appears to have been to 
leave the SOEs which were making profits with the Corporations. Under such an approach, SOEs in 
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all sectors, even jute, indicated that, with the right support and market opportunities they could 
become profitable. In such a policy milieu it was not surprising that privatisation did not assume any 
significant momentum . Thus, following the assassination of President Zia when the BNP party was 
removed from power by a military coup in March 1982, virtually all the SOEs inherited by this 
regime from the period of Awami League rule remained within the state sector. Similarly, all these 
banks and insurance companies taken over in 1972 also remained under state ownership. The 
preservation of the status of the SOEs had however gone hand in hand with a rapid extension of 
private enterprises in industry, the emergence of some privately owned banks and insurance 
companies. These initiatives to support private enterprise still left the state sector as the paramount 
entrepreneur in 1982 both in modern industry and in the financial sector. 
 
In the agricultural sector, aid conditionalities applied by the World Bank and U.S. Aid during the 
late 1970's, pressured the GOB to privatise the distribution of agricultural inputs hitherto 
monopolised by the state owned Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). Up to 
the early 1980s there was no significant pressure from within Bangladesh's private sector to 
accelerate the process of privatisation. Those who were engaged in private enterprise were 
sufficiently preoccupied with the opportunities for investment in greenfield enterprises, provided 
through the liberal lending policies of the DFIs. Whilst the erstwhile Bangali jute and textile mill 
owners never gave up on seeking the return of their nationalised enterprises most of them had moved 
into other areas of business and did not appear to be excessively preoccupied with the privatisation 
of their mills. 
 
From divestment to privatisation 
 
Table 2 gives the dispersal of sales over different time periods. Table 3 establishes that in numerical 
terms the bulk of the units to be divested were small units but in value terms the top 121 units, with 
assets above Tk. 2.5 million contributed 97% of the total sale value, 44 units with assets above Tk. 
10 million accounted for 77% of the sale value of the privatised units. 
 
Table 2 shows that beginning from 1975, to June 1981, which covers the Zia era, 247 abandoned 
enterprises had been privatised with a sale value of Tk. 529 million. The unit value of these sales 
comes to Tk. 2.1 million which suggests that a large size of enterprise was now being privatised. The 
larger units however, remained with the Sector corporations throughout the Zia era. The acceleration 
of the divestiture process thus really dates from the period when General Ershad took over power 
through a military coup in March 1982. During the decade of 1982-91, which largely overlaps with 
the Ershad regime, only 125 enterprises were divested but these units were valued at Tk. 1.26 billion 
with a unit value of Tk. 10.1 million. This suggests that a much larger size of enterprise, mostly 
drawn from enterprises under the sector corporations, were put up for divestiture.  
 
The process of privatisation in Bangladesh thus effectively dates from the Ershad era when, for the 
first time, enterprises which had been brought under the direct ownership of the GOB under P.O. 27 
were released for sale to private buyers. Prior to this period the 361 enterprises so far privatised had 
not been classified in the SOE sector or had been incorrectly included and were thus released to their 
former owners. 1982 would thus serve as an appropriate dividing line between the phase of 
divestiture of abandoned units administered by the government and the actual privatisation of SOEs, 
under the juridical ownership of the state. 
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The decision by the Ershad government to initiate such a process of privatisation of units, hitherto 
under public management, did not however derive from any clear policy premise. The New 
Industrial Policy (NIP) of 1982, which was the first holistic policy statement of the GOB to embrace 
the World Bank Structural Adjustment Reforms (SAR), spoke of a policy to promote private sector 
development but only made a passing reference to the privatisation of public enterprises. The NIP 
did not clearly spell out a policy indicating which areas will be exposed to privatisation and which 
would remain under public ownership. Each set of decisions to privatise a particular state enterprise 
tended to be an ad hoc decision originating in an executive order specific to the enterprise or to 




The first big round of privatisation initiated in 1982 related to the return of the Bengali owned jute 
and textile mills covered by the Presidential Order of March 1972. The policy premise of these 
executive decisions remains obscure since it applied an ethnic premise to the privatisation process 
rather than an economic rationale which would have covered all the units nationalised under P.O. 27. 
The logical decision would have been to legislate the de-nationalisation of the jute and textile 
industry and to thereby put up all units in these two industries for private investment. In 1982, jute 
and textiles together accounted for around 60 of the value added in the manufacturing sector so that 
any decision to privatise these units would have initiated a major change in the ownership structure 
of the modern industrial sector. The GOB, however, took a decision to divest only the Bengali 
owned units to their former owners. The GOB's decision did not expose such a privatisation process 
to any form of competitive bidding or take into account whether the former owners were still in 
business, were keen to return to the management of their enterprise or were even alive.  
 
A decision to restore the industry to their former owners would have involved inviting the former 
Pakistani owners to reassume the ownership of the same enterprises they had abandoned in 
December 1971. The Ershad regime presumed that such a decision, even in 1984, a decade after 
liberation, would have aroused some political furore in Bangladesh, even under a Martial Law 
regime. This proposition is, however, only a presumption since the then GOB never did spell out 
why they limited their privatisation decision only to those industries owned by Bengalis. Such a 
disinvestment decision is possibly rare around the world. The Malaysian policy of favouring 
divestiture of SOEs to Malays or bhumiputras,  approximated the then GOB policy. Under the 
prevailing world order, however, issues of discrimination and human rights are attracting the 
attention of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The validity of such an ethnic based 
disinvestment process, under the prevailing world norms, may, thus, not only be politically 
unsustainable but could even be legally challenged under the WTO for being discriminatory and 
hence hostile to fair trade. Fortunately for the GOB, no former Pakistani owner has challenged this 
ethnically-driven decision of the GOB or sought, through the courts, a restitution of their industries. 
Some Pakistanis did, however, in that period, visit Bangladesh to explore the possibility of a return 
of their enterprises. They were discretely advised by people of influence in Bangladesh that such a 
policy was politically unsaleable. It was, thus, hardly worth the investment of their money and effort 
to recover their erstwhile enterprises, particularly in industries which were already being categorised 
as sunset industries in Bangladesh. 
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Policy-less privatisation 
 
It was around the time of the 1982 NIP that the GOB began to publicly embrace the world view 
propagated by Thatcher, Reagan and subsequently the World Bank that SOEs were inherently `bad' 
and that `bureaucrats' should get out of business. Under this anti-state world view it was taken for 
granted that bureaucrats' were pathologically incapable of running any industry. By a process of 
intellectual osmosis all managers of SOEs were ascribed with the pejorative term of bureaucrat. 
This political shift in the rhetoric of the GOB was however never translated into policy doctrine. To 
this day there is no policy decision spelling out which industries or even sectors of the economy will 
be retained under public ownership and how many will be privatised. What we have is a series of 
loose re-statements of popular clichés that the business of the government is not business. But no 
categorical statement of what actually is the business of the government, has been forthcoming from 
successive GOBs.  
 
The conceptualization of these rhetorical positions by successive GOBs was thus left to the World 
Bank in their various policy pronouncements offered through their annual country  economic 
memorandums (CEM) presented every year to the Bangladesh Aid Consortium meeting in Paris. The 
donor's own policy positions on privatisation were more explicitly stated in particular policy loan 
documents and finally in a grey cover report prepared in the World Bank's South Asia department 
(World Bank 1994a). 
 
In the years preceding the publication of the World Bank's Bangladesh privatisation report and 
subsequent to it, the World Bank had attempted to move the issue of privatisation in Bangladesh 
from the realm of philosophy to that of policy. The World Bank sought some categorical 
commitments from the GOB to privatise particular activities. Thus, for example, a number of policy 
loans, dating back to the end of the 1970s, committed the GOB to privatise and desubsidise fertilizer 
distribution and to sell off irrigation equipment held with various public agencies. These policy 
commitments sought from the GOB, reached their culmination in the Food Crop Sector Loan 
(FCSL) signed by the GOB in 1989 with the ADB. The FCSL, committed the GOB to a time bound 
agenda to sell off all irrigation equipment under the ownership or control of public agencies and to 
privatise fertiliser distribution at all levels, including imports. The GOB's role was to be limited to 
producing nitrogenous and phosphatic fertiliser in a number of SOEs under the Bangladesh 
Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) and to sell this product at the factory gate to private 
traders. Failure to meet these disinvestment targets, at least for the sale of irrigation equipment, 
exposed the GOB to suspension of aid to the agricultural sector not only from the ADB but from the 
World Bank and other donors under cross conditionality clauses. Indeed failure to meet the 
schedules to the ADB under the FCSL exposed the GOB to cross conditionalities in other loans 
outside the agriculture sector, on offer by ADB, which demanded commitments by the GOB to 
divest themselves of irrigation equipment. 
 
The World Bank, as in 1990, introduced conditionalities to privatise those jute mills, formerly 
owned by Pakistanis, but still under the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation. This was part of a wider 
set of conditionalities imposed by the World Bank on the GOB. These, involved closure of some 
publicly owned mills and privatisation of the remainder. Similar provisions to privatise particular 
textile mills still held with the Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation, other units under the Sector 
Corporation and certain Nationalised Commercial Banks (NCBs), found their way into particular 
policy loans to the GOB from the ADB and World Bank. 
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The GOB had, as part of its implicit policy of ethnically driven privatisation process, also returned 
two NCB's, Uttara and Pubali Bank, to their former Bengali owners and had also returned Bengali 
owned insurance companies to their former owners. None of these actions of the GOB had any 
policy cover since ethnic disinvestment still had not been recognised as official policy. 
 
Table 2 indicates that the GOB eventually disinvested 486 enterprises between 1972 and 1996, 
valued at Tk. 2.4 billion and in that time value added from manufacturing SOEs, in relation to GDP, 
had been more than halved. This is quite an achievement by Third World standards and hard to 
match, outside Chile and Eastern Europe. However, notwithstanding this impressive record, 
successive GOBs, to date, have not yet placed a policy statement before parliament, on privatisation 
policy. This has not   prevented these regimes from making eloquent protestations about their desire 
to privatise large parts of the state sector without spelling out what, why, to what extent and how 
rapidly this process will be carried through. 
 
Privatisation in the contemporary era 
 
As of today, private enterprise has moved ahead to establish private schools, universities and 
hospitals. Private and public enterprise thus co-exist in areas hitherto under the public domain. In the 
absence of clear policy guidance, academics from state universities and quasi-government research 
institutes, along with doctors attached to various government hospitals, moonlight quite openly in 
the service of these private institutions whilst drawing their salaries from the public purse. 
 
In recent years the area of public utilities has also been opened up to private enterprise. In the case of 
telecommunications, private firms have been given franchises for cellular phones, which are 
interlinked to the lines of the state owned telecom system. The lead in this area has been taken by the 
world-renowned Grameen Bank, which has entered into a business collaboration with Norway's 
state owned telecom company to introduce cellular phone services to the rural areas. Grameen 
Telecom are now negotiating to use the idle capacity of the fibre-optic telecommunications links of 
the Bangladesh Railways to reduce the costs of their services.  
 
The GOB has now also committed itself to induct private foreign investors into power generation. 
As of May 1997, contracts, both for fixed and barge mounted installations have been signed by 
particular foreign companies and the Power Development Board, who are committed to buy the 
output of these private producers at an agreed price. Power distribution still remains in the public 
domain but in some areas, on an experimental basis, power distribution has been privatised into the 
hands of either some private agents or a collective of Power Board employees. In other areas of 
service delivery, private security firms market services to private commercial establishments and the 
houses of the elite.  
 
In the prevailing milieu there is no area of economic activity which has been left as exclusive to the 
public domain. Each encroachment by the private sector into public space is viewed by the GOB on 
its merits rather than as part of any clear policy. In all these areas opened up to private enterprise the 
state still remains the major provider so that an admixture of public and private enterprises co-exists 
within a state of permanent evolution. This has exposed, what today constitutes the public sector, to 
total uncertainty as to their future since there is no activity under the control of the state which is not 
open to privatisation.  




The invisible privateers 
 
In the absence of any clear guidelines defining the division of labours between the public and private 
sector, the stars remain the limit for what may be undertaken by the private sector. However within 
this open ended environment for private enterprise much less is known about the performance of the 
private sector, particularly in areas which were once under the public sector. Unfortunately, for a 
country, where the argument for privatisation has been at the forefront of the agenda of donor driven 
policy reforms and where three successive regimes have committed themselves to privatisation, a 
veil appears to have been drawn over the performance of Bangladesh's privatised enterprises who 
seem to have become invisible. In the remainder of this paper we thus attempt to give more visibility 
to the performance of the privatised units. This exercise draws upon the limited evidence at hand 
from the few attempts made so far to provide some information on the privatised enterprises of 
Bangladesh. 
  
Up to March 1991, even though 505 enterprises had been privatised no piece of paper was available 
with the GOB indicating what may have transpired within these units since their privatisation. Nor 
did the aid agencies who had so enthusiastically pushed the privatisation agenda initiate any major 
empirical investigation of the fate of the privatised enterprises to establish the validity of their now 
axiomatic advice to the GOB, that privatisation would lead to improved economic performance both 
at the enterprise level and for the economy at large. Thus, considering that by 1991 nearly 500 SOEs 
had been privatised and the GOB was under pressure from donors to divest itself of the remainder of 
the SOEs still under the Sector Corporations, or in the form of NCBs, some indication of how these 
privatised units had fared would have been of enormous help to policymakers in seeing how far and 
fast they may persevere along the road to privatisation. 
 
The GOB appears to have been moved by the general belief that once a unit had been privatised 
there was no further need for them to lose any sleep about what happened to the unit. This position 
was however rendered somewhat untenable by virtue of the fact that all units so divested had 
assumed their ownership by making a down payment on the contracted cost of the privatised unit. 
Thus the GOB retained an ongoing responsibility to collect the outstanding balance of the sale price 
from the buyers of the SOEs. Whilst most of the amount due from the SOEs divested upto 1981 had 
been repaid (8% of Tk. 40 million of the sale value was overdue), 21% of Tk. 267 million of the sale 
proceeds of SOEs sold between 1981 and 1991 still remained to be collected. Thus, as of 30 June 
1996, 14.5% or Tk. 328 million of SOE sale proceeds still remain to be collected. Whilst this is not a 
big figure in relation to the diverse obligations owing to the state, the GOB could not remain 
indifferent to the fate of these privatised enterprises, even though they are now in private hands.  
 
However, of more serious concern to the GOB than it sales dues was the fact that most, if not all, 
privatised SOEs inherited overdrafts to the NCBs, accumulated prior to their disinvestment. The 
sub-market price set by the GOB as the privatisation price of the SOE owed largely to the liabilities 
passed on to the private buyer. Thus the state, through its NCBs and DFIs, retained an ongoing 
relation with most of these divested enterprises until they discharged their debt liabilities owing to 
the public financial institutions. There is some casual evidence, now under empirical investigation, 
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that many of these liabilities carried over by the disinvested SOEs and further compounded during 
their tenure in private hands, remain outstanding to the NCBs. Thus the GOB retains a stake in the 
post-privatisation performance of the SOEs both to be able to collect on its dues as well as to 
confirm if their assumptions about more efficient management under private ownership, have been 
realised. Over the last decade only a few papers, largely using secondary data, had attempted a 
review of the impact of privatisation and this has been limited to a small range of industries (Sobhan 
1993). Thus evidence on the performance of privatised units is far from conclusive because of the 
limitations of methodology and coverage, as well as the absence of basic data, due to the lack of any 
empirical work, based on contact on the ground, with the privatised enterprise. 
 
THE BOI SURVEY OF PRIVATISED ENTERPRISES - 1991 
 
The very first attempt to generate primary information through contact with the disinvested SOEs 
was carried out in early 1991 by the Board of Investment (BOI) at the be request of the Executive 
Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) during the tenure of the interim government 
under President Shahabuddin Ahmed. This was indeed the very first ever attempt by the GOB to 
contact the privatised enterprises. The BOI field exercise was based on a rough and ready and hence 
rather superficial survey, because of the limited time available to the BOI. The BOI report submitted 
to ECNEC in March 1971 indicated that out of 290 enterprises for which information had been 
collected, only 47% remained in operation and 75 or 52% had closed down (Sobhan 1991). Of those 
closed, half had ceased to function as industries and were using the premises for alternative 
purposes. 
 
It was expected that more in-depth work would be initiated by the incoming GOB, elected to office 
in February 1991 or that the World Bank would initiate an in-depth review of the outcome of 
privatisation. But no such work was forthcoming during the entire 5 year tenure of the BNP regime 
from 1991 to 1996. Whilst the BOI survey provided far from conclusive evidence about the 
performance of the privatised units, the fact that around 50% of these units had closed down 
suggested that the post-privatisation performance of these units had not been a universal success. 
This prima face evidence did, therefore, suggest a need for more intensive investigation as to why so 
many units were closed and how efficiently those that remained in operation, were doing their job. 
This information would have enabled the GOB to calibrate its ongoing privatisation policy to the 
experience on the ground registered over at least the last decade. Unfortunately the GOB remained, 
along with the World Bank, indifferent to the fate of the privatised units whilst persisting with its 
policy to accelerate the privatisation process. 
 
The slow down in privatisation 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of any evidence on the fruits of privatisation, pressure from the donors on 
the GOB intensified to press on regardless. The fact that only six units were privatised by the BNP 
government between 1991 and 1996, inspite of a commitment to accelerate the process, provoked 
the belief amongst the donors that the newly elected regime of the BNP under Khaleda Zia had 
weakened in its resolve to push ahead with privatisation. This unsubstantiated perception of the 
GOB's intentions invited further pressures from the World Bank to accelerate the privatisation of the 
remaining SOEs under the sector cooperations as well as the NCB. Specific units were targeted by 
the World Bank for privatisation within a defined time period. 
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The failure of the GOB during the 1990s to match the performance of the Ershad regime's rather 
robust approach to privatisation during the 1980's remained something of an enigma to Bangladesh's 
donors. Again, without investigating the circumstances underlying the slow sown in the privatisation 
process in the 1990's, the Bank argued that the Privatisation Board (PB), chaired by a retired 
bureaucrat, was too weak to push ahead with privatisation.  The belief was then propagated that a 
private sector chief executive of the PB may privatise the SOEs more expeditiously. 
 
Thus the new Awami League-led government elected to office in June 1996, appointed a well 
known businessman, to become chairman of the Privatisation Board. This gentleman, was uniquely 
for a statutory body, given the rank of a State Minister and permitted to continue with his own 
business operations, whilst serving as Honorary Chairman of the Privatisation Board. The new 
Chairman has committed himself to accelerate the process of privatisation and has immediately 
advertised the sale of a large number of units now under the sector corporations, a number of which 
are profit-making enterprises. 
 
This approach by successive GOBs, both acting under donor pressure, takes the view that the pace of 
the privatisation process is entirely supply-driven and is hence dictated by the seriousness of intent 
of the respective GOBs. Little attention is given about the intensity of demand by prospective buyers 
of the divested SOEs. Little thought is given to the possibility that such private buyers may be few in 
number because of the limited pool of business talent in the country and the scarcity of investible 
resources at hand. Indeed if such resources were at hand why would prospective private investor not 
invest this in a greenfield enterprise rather than on an old unit, with obsolete equipment, saddled 
with both debts and problems. Lack of any such reflection on the demand-side constraint appears to 
have pushed donors to suggest that the GOB reduce the price of the divested units or absolve their 
liabilities. The failure of an elected government to make such non-transparent decisions, so as to 
expedite the privatisation process is then interpreted as a failure of intent. This unidimensional 
approach to privatisation is now driving on the present GOB, again under donor pressure, to be rid 
of the SOEs at any cost. 
 
THE BIDS SURVEY ON PRIVATISATION OUTCOMES - 1997 
 
The new GOB as well as the Privatisation Board still remain in deep ignorance about the fate of the 
privatised units who demonstrate little, if any transparency to either the GOB, their bankers or 
researchers on their post-privatisation performance. Visits to these companies, rarely yield any 
quantitative information. A recent study commissioned by the incumbent Minister of Finance, was 
carried out at the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), under the direction of 
Binayak Sen. This study, constrained again by time, is far from insightful into what is going on in 
these privatised units, but does provide some crude primary information on their current status. Sen's 
study, based on the BIDS survey, could only provide some first hand information to indicate 
whether units were operational or not and could elicit some qualitative observations from workers 
and those of the management who agreed to talk to the investigators, about the profitability of their 
enterprises. Since Sen's data is yet to be fully analysed and published, I will, with due 
acknowledgement to his pioneering effort, make only limited use of his survey. 
 
The BIDS survey covered 205 enterprises privatised from 1979 onward. This excluded around 300 
units privatised prior to 1979 and listed in the BOI surveys. Of the 205 units surveyed by BIDS, only 
112 (54.6%) were found operational, 83 (40.5%) were closed and 10 (4.9%) were proved to be non-
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existent. The fact that 54.6% of the units, as of April 1997, were operational, compared to 47% 
which were found operational in March 1991 in the BOI survey, may perhaps reflect the fact that the 
BIDS survey restricted itself to units privatised since 1979 since the smaller older units may be 
expected to have a higher casualty rate. However both surveys indicate that around half of the 
disinvested units have indeed closed down. It is to be noted from the BIDS survey that of these units 
in operation some had remained closed for around 5.5% of the time as between their privatisation 
and the date of the BIDS survey. Of those units that were currently closed, at the time of the BIDS 
survey, they had, since divestiture remained closed for 47.5% of the time. 31% of these units had 
closed down in the last four years. It would appear that such privatised enterprises step in and out of 
operation as their circumstances change so that continuity of operations of such units, including 




Of the 112 units found to be operational, 8% were deemed to be operating at 100% capacity, 56.3% 
at 75-99% capacity, 25% at 50-74% capacity and 10.8% at below 50% capacity. Here again, the 
survey estimates remain impressionistic, originating from people interviewed at the enterprise, and is 
not based on quantitative evidence. Nor does the survey indicate if estimates of capacity use are 
based on single or multiple shift capacity use. Casual empiricisms indicates that a number of 
enterprises have the potential to operate at double and some even at triple shift capacity. Thus 
estimates based on a single shift would provide an estimate of capacity use at well below the 
potential of many of the privatised enterprises. 
 
Similarly impressionistic evidence about enterprise profitability reports that of the 195 enterprises 
for which information is available only 5.6% termed themselves to be highly profitable, 33.8% as 
profitable, 6.7% as breaking even, 16.3% as loss making and 43.6% as sustaining high losses. Since 
83 of the 205 reporting units were reported to be closed and may be presumed to have been losing 
concerns, but 122 units were reported as making losses, it may again be presumed that 39 of the 112 
units (35%), which are reported as operational, appear to be making losses. 
 
How far did privatisation help to improve the performance of enterprises compared to their pre-sale 
position? If we compare the divested units, pre-and post divestiture, it may be observed that prior to 
divestiture, 9 units were highly profitable in contrast to 11 units becoming profitable after 
divestiture. Thus another 2 of 11 units which were profitable improved their profitability after 
divestiture but in the 9 other cases, units which were highly profitable as SOEs continued to be 
highly profitable when privatised. A positive outcome of privatisation appears in evidence from the 
fact that the number of units reporting to be profitable increased in number from 38 to 66 after 
divestiture. This implies that of the 26 units reported as breaking even prior to divestiture, 13 units 
became  profitable after divestiture whilst of 105 units reported as sustaining losses prior to 
divestiture, 15 units became profitable. In contrast, where only 17 units reported high losses prior to 
privatisation, now 85 units reported high losses. Thus, of the 105 units reporting losses prior to 
privatisation, 15 units became profitable, 20 units continued to make losses but 70 units moved into 
the category of high losers. 
 
 
This picture emerging from the BIDS survey, may well be a statistical artifact demanding fuller 
analysis as well as more in-depth investigation of the situation prevailing in each enterprise. In the 
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absence of any balance sheet information, investigation could be made with the commercial banks to 
ascertain whether the surveyed units today, reported to be profitable, are in default to the banks. In 
the absence of such investigation, which will hopefully be forthcoming at a later stage of the Sen 
study, an impression may be drawn that privatisation may have helped to make some break even and 
loss making units profitable but may have also contributed to the aggravation of losses and eventual 
closure of a number of loss making units. In between, we have the added problem of 35% of the 
operating units surveyed by BIDS, reporting that they are making losses today.  
 
This picture suggests that privatisation has its positive and negative aspects. Though, if one takes the 
 view that closure of loss making units is also a positive feature of privatisation, then the Bangladesh 
experience may well be more promising than is apparent from the proportion of units reported to be 
closed. Another interesting point about the closed units is that 28 of the 83 closed units restructured 
themselves. Of these renovated enterprises only 10 moved into alternative production activities, 
whilst 18 used the land to open shops, hotels, storage facilities or used it for residential purposes. Of 
the 112 operating units, 39% reported some product diversification which suggests a capacity for 
resilience amongst units which have made themselves more profitable. It is possible that these units 
which graduated from loss to profits may have achieved this through some effort at product 
diversification. 
 
These observations about the positive impact of privatisation must remain qualified until evidence 
about enterprise profitability is backed by more categorical quantitative evidence, including 
information on the credit status of these profitable enterprises available with the banks. Thus a more 
focused exercise would need to examine how far the privatised SOEs, both closed and operating, are 
in default of their debt repayments to the commercial banks as well as the DFIs, and whether they 
have increased or reduced their bank liabilities since their privatisation. Another area of objective 
and independently assembled source of evidence would be to ascertain information about tax 
payments, both direct and indirect, by each enterprises before and after privatisation. This would 
enable us to ascertain whether the operating as well as closed enterprises have passed on some of 
their liabilities to the banks and the Board of Revenue and whether those units reporting their 
profitability, can do so by virtue of defaulting on their fiscal obligations.  
 
Disemployment after divestiture 
 
More objective information elicited from the BIDS surveyed enterprises indicate that one of the end 
products of privatisation has been the reduction in levels of employment in the surveyed operating 
enterprises by 24.2% from 108,645 to 82,354. It is also to be noted that within the down-sized 
operating units, of the 82,354 now employed, 32,813 or 40% were new recruits. Thus, only 49,541 
(47%) of the 108,645 originally employed in the operating units retained their jobs which indicates 
that in these operating units, 59,104 (53%) people lost their jobs after the privatisation. If we taken 
into account that 39,007 out of 40,319 workers in the closed enterprises have also lost their jobs, 
then the disemployment effect of privatisation may be measured by observing that of the 148,964 in 
employment prior to privatisation, 98,111 or two-thirds of the labour force, have lost their jobs either 
through enterprise closure or through dismissal from the now operating enterprises.  
 
 
This job loss of 98,111 has been only partially compensated by provision of new employment to 
32,813 workers, implying a net loss in employment of 44% in the post-privatised units. It is feasible 
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that this downsizing in the operating enterprises as well as in restructuring of their labour force has 
helped to transform loss making units into profitable units. How many of the 98,000 disemployed 
SOE employees have since found gainful employment also remains unclear. The social costs of 
privatisation would thus appear to be quite severe and have to be adjusted against the positive impact 
of improved profitability in some privatised enterprises.  
 
The balance sheet of privatisation 
 
The available evidence on the experience with privatisation suggests that enterprise closure, 
disemployment, possible accumulation of liabilities with the banks and possible revenue loss may 
have to be taken into account as part of the price we pay to improve profitability and reduce claims 
on the public exchequer. However the positive macro-economic impact of privatisation appears to 
be far from evident. Reports on the profit and loss accounts of the Sector Corporations from which 
SOEs are being divested, indicate that in the four years, 1979/80-1982/83, prior to the great wave of 
privatisation under President Ershad, total profits for 6 sector corporations added up to Tk. 1.5 
billion and net profits were earned by the SOEs in three out of these 4 years (World Bank, 1985). In 
1982/83, the last year prior to the big privatisations, SOE profits amounted to Tk. 912 million. This 
does not suggest that SOEs in Bangladesh were always a net drain on the public purse. In 1995/96, 
at the end of the BNP regime and the privatisation of 131 enterprises with a selling value of Tk. 1.8 
billion, corporation losses increased to Tk. 3.2 billion (IRBD 1996). This suggests that a central 
argument for SOE privatisation, the reduction of macro-economic imbalances, appears to be invalid, 
at least in the context of Bangladesh.  
 
Some outcomes of bank privatisation 
 
During this period of divestiture, the volume of bank defaults to the commercial banks has also 
increased. This suggests that reduction of the size of the state sector and expansion of the private 
sector have brought no relief to the banking system just as it has brought no relief to the exchequer. 
 
Nor has the process of bank privatisation improved banking discipline or ensured that private banks 
will operate in a more disciplined way than the NCBs. In 1996 classified loans as a proportion of 
total loans from all commercial banks stood at 31.5%. However whilst 32.6% of NCB loans were 
classified, 34.8% of the loans of private commercial banks were classified. If we look at the portfolio 
of two privatised banks, in 1996, Pubali Bank reported 53.6% of its loans as classified and Uttara 
Bank reported 34.9% of its loan portfolio as classified. Amongst the new private banks, City Bank 
reported a loan classification ratio of 50.8%, Eastern Bank of 49.6% and Al-Baraka Bank of 41.8%. 
Most of these private banks reported a high proportion of their classified loans as bad or 
uncollectable.  
 
The evidence at hand suggest that much of the adverse loan classification of the private banks was 
due to insider lending, where private bank directors have been illegally appropriating bank 
advances, contrary to existing banking laws, and then defaulting on their obligations to their own 
banks. This does not condone the massive crisis of the NCBs due to malfeasant and politicised 
lending and weak loan recovery. Nor does it excuse the delinquency of the Central Bank in 
discharging its function as a regulator of the banking system. But what is clear is that Bangladesh's 
experience with bank privatisation contributed towards aggravating the crisis of the banking system. 
The fact that a third of the commercial bank's loan portfolios remain classified and that 90% of the 
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borrowers to the DFIs are in default (Sobhan, 1993), suggest that in the post- privatisation era after 
1982, the private sector has emerged as a massive defaulter to the banking system and that the era of 
privatisation has becoming synonymous with what is now termed as the default culture in 
Bangladesh. The practice of rescheduling of loans to habitual defaulters has if anything 
reinvigorated the defaulters to compound their default in the expectation of a fresh rescheduling of 
their loans. 
 
CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The new privatisation agenda 
 
On the basis of the available evidence, a decade and a half of exposure to a vigorous and donor 
assisted programme of privatisation has yielded few benefits to the Bangladesh economy. With a 
few exceptions, privatised units have not significantly improved performance but have contributed 
to enterprise closures and disemployment. Private sector default to the banks has increased 
exponentially whilst private banks have been characterised by more adverse loan portfolios than the 
NCBs and have been maledicted to large scale insider trading. In such circumstances, prudence 
amongst the policymakers and even amongst the ideologically committed donors would have 
dictated some caution in the current drive to privatise both the SOEs as well as the NCBs. This 
pause would have benefited from a more careful analysis of what has happened to the private sector, 
as to enterprise closure, profitability, efficiency, employment, revenue generation, bank default as 
well as the quality of bank portfolios. More to the point, this evidence would have permitted for a 
better understanding of why privatisation has not been as fruitful as was predicted and what steps 
might be taken to make both past and future privatisation more productive. 
 
The privatisation agenda of the incumbent regime, under the Awami League, appears to have 
committed the GOB to an aggressive drive for privatisation without any attempt to evaluate the 
outcome from earlier privatisations undertaken by their predecessors. The declared philosophy of the 
newly constituted Privatisation Board is to get rid of SOEs from the public domain as fast as 
possible. This approach indicates some indifference as to whether such units, once privatised, are 
closed down and their land sold off for use in commercial or real estate ventures. Nor is there any 
indication that these units will have to account for their accumulated liabilities to the banking 
system.  
 
Implications for Bangladesh's future development options 
 
Such an approach to privatisation implies a certain innocence of vision in charting Bangladesh's 
future development landscape and the industrial strategy to be located within this design. In the 
prevailing policy vacuum, the current approach to privatisation thus appears to have introduced an 
entirely new logic to the divestiture process. Official policy no longer appears to be driven by the 
concern to ensure improvement, through privatisation, in enterprise performance along with 
improved outcomes at the level of the macro-economy in the way of fiscal balances, higher growth 
and employment. The goal today appears to be to get the state out of any `business' ventures in 
which it is involved, whatever be the cost in terms of profits, employment or efficiency. This reflects 
a policy shift from a pragmatic,  efficiency driven policy for privatisation to an ideologically driven 
agenda. Such a drastic change in the goals of privatisation policy would at the least appear to 
demand a clear definition of such a policy, its discussion and support in parliament and perhaps even 
a public referendum, where popular support can be mobilised behind an ideologically driven agenda 
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for promoting privatisation and public disownership. 
 
In the current climate where SOE's, even those which are profitmaking, are being threatened with 
privatisation, no serious effort is now made to diagnose the problems of the SOEs or to improve 
their performances. Thus, there is little incentive for those units still under public ownership, to 
make the effort to improve themselves. Indeed there is now some inducement for employees to 
increase their predation on SOE resources before they are finally sold-off. There is some indication 
from ongoing research at the Centre for Policy Dialogue, that the exponential increase in SOE losses 
has coincided with the move towards a more aggressive privatisation policy in the mid-1980s. 
Enterprise level information on SOEs indicates a rapid deterioration in performance once they have 
been listed for privatisation. It is arguable that such an outcome is no accident of fate, but inherent in 
a policy-less approach to privatisation. Since the privatisation process may be more protracted than 
was once contemplated, a policy of indiscriminate privatisation could thus not only lead to mounting 
claims on the exchequer but would accentuate the disincentives for any prospective buyers. 
   
A further hazard to Bangladesh's development prospects arises from the implications of a policy 
which envisages no future role for public enterprise in the manufacturing sector. In an earlier era, 
public intervention through SOE was designed to fill an entrepreneurial vacuum in areas deemed of 
strategic value in a development strategy designed to accelerate and diversify the economy. If the 
private sector was not forthcoming in these areas, the state was expected to come foreward as a risk 
taking entrepreneur, whether as a SOE or as a partner in a joint-venture with the private sector, 
where it could step out when private enterprise was ready to assume or widen its equity and/or 
management stake (Hexner). Donors were once quite willing to underwrite such a strategy. Today 
such an option is no longer available to the GOB since donors have not only cut off all aid to finance 
public enterprise in the manufacturing sector but aid conditionalities forbid the GOB from setting up 
any new SOE. This means that in a whole range of manufacturing activities, which may be critical to 
the growth of the economy, where private enterprise is not forthcoming or is coming in at a very 
slow pace, Bangladesh is denied the scope for initiating public action. This has, over the last decade, 
left Bangladesh with a narrow manufacturing base where very little diversification has taken place 
outside of the RMG which is Bangladesh's leading industry and exporter (IRBD, 1996, Ch. 8).  
   
By the time of the expiry of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005, Bangladesh will have to 
establish backward linkages with a modernised textile industry which can produce the yarn and 
fabric needed to service Bangladesh's RMG sector. Unless Bangladesh can convert its RMG sector 
from a two-stage processing industry to a three-stage enterprise, after 2005, the rules of origin clause 
in the WTO could deny Bangladesh's RMG exports entry to a large part of their traditional markets 
in Europe and North America. This involves putting in place, within Bangladesh, a domestic 
manufacturing capacity to produce 2 billion metres of fabric. This involves setting up around 375 
new weaving mills and 290 new spinning mills, involving an investment of around US $ 5 billion. 
On all counts, making the most optimistic assumptions, Bangladesh's private entrepreneurs expect to 
mobilise only a fraction of such resources for which they will need to assume the risk taking burden 
for realising such a volume of investment. In such circumstances should the state sector remain idle 
and make no attempt to put any productive capacity in place, even if this means a loss of RMG 
markets to India and China who already preside over large integrated textile industries and are 
planning major investments for the post-MFA era? The failure to address this dilemma provides the 
source of the present contradictions inherent in Bangladesh's privatisation policy. This could have 
potentially fatal implications for Bangladesh's future development. 
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